Eliminate the weaknesses of the arena successfully! Edwards has said goodbye to himself in the past

The Timberwolves won again at the Warriors' home court, and Edwards also continued his excellent performance and scored 30+ consecutively. More importantly, he has completed the optimization of his weaknesses. This issue of the column will take you to understand through in-depth data analysis.

The Timberwolves once reached the Western Conference Finals last season but eventually lost. Edwards also exposed his weakness: when the opponent uses double-team defense against him, his offensive success rate will decrease and pass mistakes will increase significantly. But as he travels this season's playoff journey, he has found a way to deal with the double-team strategy, which is also the key to his ability to score 30 points in a row. So what changes have he made?

The first change was the change of teammates. Of course, this may not be his active change. The other offensive core of the team last season was Towns. Towns was a player who ended up. In addition, point guard Conley was too old, so last season's Timberwolves actually had only Edwards one offensive starting point:

In the playoffs last season, Edwards' non-assisted rate reached 70.5%. Combined with Edwards' main player's assist rate of 27.7%, Edwards actually had a large core offensive system with the ball in his possession. In addition, he was not a player with outstanding offense, which also led to his opponent's double-teaming strategy being very effective.

However, the situation is different this season. Although Edwards' non-assisted rate is still the first in the main team, it has dropped to 48.8%, and the assist rate of the score has increased significantly. In addition to Gobert, who scored more second-time offenses, his scoring proportion with Randle's non-assisted scores is very close to Randle's score. Combined with Randle's main team's assist rate of 28.1%, the Timberwolves are now an offensive system launched by dual-cores. Both of them can send assists and can end the ball by themselves. Randle has undertaken the most organizational tasks, so Edwards no longer needs to play the role of holding the ball and holding the ball, and he has more catch and end.

The end of the ball means that Edwards is in a state of no ball more time. In all areas on the offensive end, Edwards has a certain proportion of assisted attacks in all areas except for mid-range. In the absence of ball, the opponent cannot use double-team unless it is extreme. This leads to Edwards having more chances of receiving the ball out of the phone, and also reduces the possibility of being double-teamed. In addition, he can take the ball at any time and starts the ball-holding attack again, making the offense more diversified, making it difficult for the opponent to use double-team defense.

The second change is the offensive area. Last season, Edwards had a high proportion of mid-range shots, while this season Edwards's was more concentrated in the three-second zone and outside the three-point line.

If the opponent outside the three-point line adopts double-team, Edwards will have more room to allocate the ball to his teammates, and his teammates will also have greater room to shoot. Although the opponent can also use double-team in the three-second zone, Edwards can choose to drill back and squeeze in in this zone and score or make a foul directly. The changes in the main offensive area also make it difficult for the opponent to use double-team or double-team to pay a greater price.

The third change is the offensive method. If he really falls into positional battles, the opponent will naturally form a stable defensive system. Therefore, Edwards pays more attention to offensive and defensive conversions. Before the opponent's defense is formed, Edwards used his high movement and flexibility to score. Edwards averaged offensive and defensive conversions per game in the playoffs of 3.4 times, and his effective shooting percentage after combining the three-point shootings reached the highest of 68.5% of the 10 players with the most offensive and defensive conversions per game. His offensive and defensive conversion production is more sufficient and efficient enough.

Teammates share the ball-holding task, main offensive area and avoid falling into positional battles. Of course, the increase in consciousness and experience gradually adapting to being double-teamed is also the talent of the No. 1 pick. He has bid farewell to the past self who was overwhelmed by double-teaming.